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Abstract
We consider the treatment of uncertainty in models of the effects of benefits 
on incentives to work. We review literature in which benefit entitlement and 
labour market prospects are treated as uncertain. We then further illustrate 
the issues when we present a two-period model of the participation decision 
of a woman married to an unemployed man who receives benefit which is means- 
tested on his wife's income. Allowing for the possibly temporary nature of 
the husband's unemployment and the uncertainty in the wife's future job 
prospects we demonstrate how participation of the wife can be explained 
despite an implicit 100% marginal rate of tax applied to her income, something 
that cannot be explained in a static model.
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The effects of cash benefit programmes on individual behaviour in market 
economies has been the subject of enormous - and continuing - attention in the 
literature. This alone provides sufficient motivation for periodic reviews. 
At the present time, a most important additional motivation is the economic 
transformation of Eastern European economies - a "current issue" not just in 
welfare economics but in every other aspect of economic analysis. What will 
be the effect of existing benefit programmes in Eastern Europe in the changed 
economic climate, for example the relatively generous family allowance 
programmes? What will be the effect of new programmes, most notably 
unemployment compensation schemes (not previously present due to the official 
absence of open unemployment in command economies and the incentives for 
enterprise managers to hoard labour)?
We do not attempt answers to these questions. Nor do we provide a 
comprehensive review of the huge body of theoretical and empirical evidence 
from Western market economies on the incentive effects of cash benefits. This 
would take far more space than we have and moreover there are available 
extensive recent reviews e.g. Atkinson (1987), Hurd (1990), Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1990). Important current issues in the literature identified 
by these reviews cover a variety of areas. These include (i) the need to 
consider the impact of the full set of institutional details of a particular 
benefit programme (there is much more to be considered than simply the level 
of benefit), (ii) the implication for behaviour of the difference in operation 
between social insurance benefit and means-tested assistance benefit, and 
(iii) the difficulties involved in practice in separating the pure effect of 
benefit schemes on behaviour from unobserved characteristics which both affect 
behaviour and benefit entitlement.1
In this chapter we highlight one aspect of the literature which we feel 
deserves more analysis: the treatment of uncertainty. Uncertainty with 
respect to benefit entitlements and labour market prospects can be expected 
to be present in both established market economies and the transitional former 
command economies. In section 2 we consider the impact of uncertainty 
surrounding entitlement to benefit. This is not allowed for in the great 
majority of analyses of disincentive effects of benefits. Although 
uncertainty is at the root of several models of the labour market that have 




























































































benefits themselves are typically viewed as certain. In reality, entitlement 
to benefit may not be known in advance with any precision, as anyone who has 
claimed any but the most simple cash benefit knows. The details of real world 
benefit schemes are typically very complex and it is often the case that the 
potential claimant cannot be sure about his or her entitlement. There may be 
uncertainty about the rules and/or uncertainty about the way the rules are 
applied by the authorities responsible for the administration of benefits. 
This can be expected to affect individuals' behaviour. Section 2 draws on the 
small literature in this area to show that the picture of disincentive effects 
obtained from standard textbook analysis with certain benefit entitlements can 
be quite misleading.
In Section 3 we consider the situation where benefit entitlement is 
certain but labour market prospects are uncertain; this also contrasts with 
the standard labour-leisure choice analysis. In this section we consider the 
impact of a given benefit system on the behaviour of the individual attempting 
to optimise in the presence of labour market uncertainty. This behaviour 
contrasts with that which one would find under certainty. In Section 4 we 
present an analysis in which uncertainty is again about labour market 
prospects rather than the operation of benefit schemes but where we focus on 
family decisions. We consider the impact of benefit schemes where entitlement 
depends on the income of a claimant's family, i.e. a "means-tested" benefit. 
This is an important institutional feature of many benefit schemes but the 
implications of this means-test for the labour supply of other family members 
has received relatively little attention. Our analysis extends a recent small 
literature on this issue which has been based on a static analysis. We show 
how the picture changes when intertemporal aspects in the presence of 
uncertainty are considered.
2. UNCERTAINTY OF ENTITLEMENT AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR
The absence of uncertainty about benefit entitlement in much analysis 
of impact of benefits on work incentives may be illustrated by considering the 
job search model.’ In the standard model an unemployed individual is seen as 
searching for work across a known distribution of wage offers. Uncertainty 
is at the root of the model. The distribution of wages is assumed to be known 




























































































offer from this distribution; it is uncertain (hence the "search"). 
Furthermore, the model allows for the receipt of a job offer (at any wage 
level) in a given period to be uncertain. In some extensions of the basic 
model the duration of a job which is accepted is additionally assumed to be 
uncertain (e.g. Hey and Mavromaras, 1981). The model defines a "reservation 
wage", the wage at which the individual is indifferent between accepting a job 
and continuing search. The level of the reservation wage determines whether 
the individual accepts a particular job offer and this level is influenced by 
all the uncertainty just described (and if applicable any benefits paid when 
in work).
However, the uncertainty applies only to jobs and wages and, in 
contrast, the entitlement to the unemployment benefits in the model (which 
also determine the reservation wage) is almost invariably considered to be 
known. The searcher is assumed to know with certainty the future stream of 
unemployment benefits.
The treatment of unemployment benefits in the job search model is 
representative in that the vast bulk of literature on the disincentive effects 
of cash benefit schemes assumes that claimants know their benefit entitlements 
with certainty. There is good reason to believe that in practice some 
considerable uncertainty may surround benefit income.
As far as unemployment benefit is concerned this uncertainty may arise 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, when an individual makes an initial claim 
for benefit it may take some time to assess entitlement; about 1 in 10 of all 
persons in the registered unemployed stock in Britain in 1988 were waiting for 
their unemployment insurance entitlement to be determined, with the figure 
very much higher in short durations (Micklewright, 1990). Secondly, in most 
unemployment compensation schemes there exists the possibility that refusal 
of a job offer may result in disqualification from benefit; the individual 
will be uncertain whether this sanction will apply in his particular case or 
not. Thirdly, the duration of benefit entitlement is finite in the typical 
unemployment insurance programme and in some countries' schemes the 
entitlement cannot be predicted with certainty at the start of the 
unemployment spell. For example, the period of entitlement to unemployment 
insurance in the US is extended if the state unemployment rate rises above a 
certain threshold. This extension applies both to new claimants and to those 
whose spell of unemployment is already in progress; the latter group could not 




























































































countries where the entitlement period is fixed, and where claimants are fully 
informed about this period, there may be considerable uncertainty surrounding 
the entitlement to any means-tested benefits which may follow unemployment 
insurance (means-tested benefit being more complex).
The evidence just given on uncertainty of unemployment benefit 
entitlement related to Western economies. Nagy (1990) provides an example of 
uncertainty surrounding this type of benefit in transitional economies. He 
finds that there was a considerable lack of information and administrative 
error in the operation of new Hungarian unemployment benefit scheme during 
1989. Evidence of uncertainty surrounding entitlement to other types of 
benefit may be seen. The divergence between actual and anticipated state 
pension benefits in the US is described by Bernheim (1987). (Mitchell, 1988, 
finds ignorance of private pension entitlement to be widespread.) The 
receipt of means-tested benefit is particularly subject to uncertainty. This 
may arise for a number of reasons. Claimants may be uncertain of getting an 
accurate assessment according to the rules of what may be a complex benefit; 
in the UK in 1975, an investigation showed that 17% of a sample of 
Supplementary Benefit claims contained some kind of administrative error 
(Supplementary Benefits Commission, 1976, p .184). Furthermore, entitlement 
to means-tested benefits may be strongly influenced by the decisions of 
officials administrating benefit programmes with considerable discretion over 
awards made.
All this suggests the need for the introduction of entitlement 
uncertainty into models of the disincentive effects of benefits. We 
illustrate the impact of benefit uncertainty on the analysis of incentives in 
a static model. This will show how the standard labour-leisure choice 
analysis can be very misleading. We take two examples from the small 
literature which has relaxed the assumption of certain entitlement.
Transition from Unemployment
The uncertainty surrounding benefits which may be received by unemployed 
family men forms the focus of the analysis by Jenkins and Millar (1989). The 
uncertainty considered does not relate to the benefit receipt when unemployed 
which Jenkins and Millar argue "in the near future is relatively certain" 
(p .138). Rather, there is assumed to be uncertainty about the means-tested 




























































































motivating their analysis, employed family heads on low income may apply for 
means-tested benefits and,
"on return to work, total family income can come from earnings, child 
benefit, family credit, and housing benefit, and at the time of the 
participation decision, the amount to be received from these various 
sources is relatively uncertain, primarily because the transition into 
work implies reassessment for means-tested benefits" (Jenkins and 
Millar, 1988, p.138).
The authors go on to point out that although the out-of-work benefits may be 
just as complex, the change in status by moving into work implies that in-work 
income is more uncertain.
The implications of this source of uncertainty is analysed by Jenkins 
and Millar in a static model. Individuals choose between certain income when 
unemployed and an uncertain in-work income. The latter is made up of three 
parts: (i) earnings which are assumed to be known, (ii) benefits received with 
certainty, and (iii) means-tested benefits received with uncertainty. 
Uncertainty surrounding means-tested in-work benefits is simplified so that 
there are only two possibilities, a relatively high benefit, F,, and a 
relatively low one, F, (= F, - d), where d is simply the difference between 
benefits received in the favourable and unfavourable cases. The relatively 
lower benefit F, is received with probability p and F, with probability 1-p, 
these being the probabilities which the individual perceives (i.e. subjective 
probabilities). Gross earned income in work is given by W times H where these 
refer to the wage and hours of work, respectively. When this form of income 
exceeds a tax-free allowance, A, it is assumed to be subject to a single 
marginal tax rate, t. A universal child benefit of B per child is paid in 
work and not included in the means-test for the in-work benefit described 
above but is assumed to be means-tested away when out of work. Income when 
out of work is given by C„. Assuming W.H > A, income in work for a person 
with n children is given by
C, = (l-t)W.H + t.A + n.B + F, with probability 1-p (1)
C, = C, - d with probability p. (2)
If individuals maximise expected utility, the individual will work if 




























































































where L, and Lu are leisure when employed and unemployed respectively and where 
the utility function U[..] is assumed to display risk aversion.
This framework is used to derive a number of results concerning the 
effects of different policy parameters on the decision to work. For example, 
the authors compare the effect on the participation decision of measures 
designed to reduce the degree of uncertainty surrounding means-testing via a 
reduction in d, with those measures increasing certain income out of work via 
child benefit, B, or subsidies to the wage, W. Jenkins and Millar stress that 
their analysis of policy options is "speculative rather than conclusive". 
However, their model shows the richer view of disincentive effects that can 
be obtained by considering income risk related to benefit entitlement.
Disability Insurance and Leaving the Labour Force
When an individual with a disability applies for a disability pension 
the receipt of that pension is not certain: it depends on a medical assessment 
of the degree of disability. Why should this uncertainty be of any behavioral 
significance? One possibility is the stigma or "hassle" associated with the 
process of application, this resulting in a failure to apply for benefit. In 
the model presented by Halpern and Hausman (1984, 1986), the impact of 
uncertainty surrounding entitlement stems from the fact that workers must quit 
work before they can apply for benefit. This requirement is present in the 
disability insurance system in the US which motivated Halpern and Hausman's 
model. In 1980 only 22% of applications for disability benefit were 
immediately granted (although the figure rose as a result of appeals against 
the initial decision) indicating a substantial degree of uncertainty 
concerning the outcome of an application (Halpern and Hausman, 1986, Table 
14.1).
Halpern and Hausman assume that if the claim is unsuccessful the wage 
that the individual may then command in the labour market is less than if no 
application for benefit had taken place. In other words, the applicant cannot 
return to a job at the previous wage. The authors argue that this assumption 
may be justified on a number of grounds: human capital may erode during the 
wait for the application to be processed; the employer may believe that the 
disability that led to the benefit claim will result in a further quit in the 
near future.




























































































in Figure 1. Let Y equal non-labour income and 0 a means-tested disability 
benefit; W is the wage in the job occupied at the time the decision to apply 
is taken and W‘ the wage that will be on offer if a claim for benefit is made 
and is rejected. The probability of a claim being accepted is p. The 
individual must therefore choose between facing on the one hand budget 
constraint OYA at wage W with certainty, and on the other ODB with probability 
p and OYC at wage W' with probability (1-p).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In order to illustrate the argument we have represented preferences in 
the diagram (indifference curve U°) such that the individual would be 
indifferent between continuing in work and applying for benefit if the latter 
were certain. The individual has however to take into account the possibility 
that a claim for benefit will be rejected which would result in him facing a 
lower wage rate than before. If the individual in the diagram believes that 
there is any uncertainty about the outcome of his application (p < 1) then no 
claim will be made.
In general, an individual will chose to apply for disability benefit if
p.U[D] + (1-p).V[W*,Y] > V[W,Y]. (4)
U[D] is the value of the direct utility function at zero hours of work in the 
event of a successful claim and V[..] is the indirect utility function 
evaluated at the relevant wages and unearned income if the individual does not 
claim, or claims and is refused. Uncertainty implies that an individual 
cannot make a simple choice between two certain alternatives and the standard 
labour-leisure analysis would be misleading, as we have described above.
Empirical Analysis
So far we have considered the disincentive effects of benefits when 
entitlement uncertainty is introduced into theoretical analysis. However, 
this type of uncertainty should also be considered in empirical analysis. 
Again, in general this is not done. For example, empirical analysis of 
unemployment duration which specifies the probabilities of leaving 
unemployment in a given week typically defines this probability as a function 




























































































work; the latter includes entitlement to means-tested benefits assumed to be 
received with certainty, see e.g. Nickell (1979), Atkinson et al (1984).
That uncertainty about benefit entitlement does appear to effect 
behaviour in practice is suggested by the empirical work on unemployment 
duration by Katz and Meyer (1990). This research used microdata from 
administrative records on individual spells of unemployment from the US. The 
authors model the individual's probability of leaving unemployment in a given 
week as a function of not only his current unemployment insurance (UI) benefit 
level but also the remaining weeks of a finite entitlement period to UI. The 
sample was drawn during a time of rising unemployment d of UI entitlement 
being triggered for some individuals present in the data, this happening after 
they had entered unemployment. The impact of real-world uncertainty is 
suggested by the coefficient of a dummy variable taking the value one in the 
week when UI entitlement would have ended were it not to have been extended. 
The probability of leaving unemployment is estimated to be sharply higher in 
this week suggesting that the subjective probability attached to an extension 
of entitlement was low; the extension was not seen as certain by the 
individuals (or by their former employers).3
Halpern and Hausman (1984, 1986) empiricise their theoretical model of 
uncertainty and disability benefit entitlement which was outlined above by 
assuming an explicit functional form for the labour supply equation. They 
then recover the corresponding indirect and then direct utility functions 
(V[.. J and U[..] in equation (4)) via Roy's Indentity (see Hausman, 1981). 
The sample survey used to estimate the model includes both claimants and non­
claimants for disability benefit and contains information on the outcome of 
claims and on wages (W , and W‘ in the case of an unsuccessful claim). A 
binary model of the probability of a claim being successful is used to 
calculate predicted values of p; the information on post-claim wages for 
unsuccessful applicants provides the basis for predicting W* for all 
individuals. These predictions are then used in the estimation of the 
empirical version of equation (4) above explaining the probability of applying 
for benefit.
The results of Halpern and Hausman's empirical model enable them to 
assess the effect of a change in p on the decision to apply for benefit. This 
effect varies with the degree of risk aversion assumed in the utility 
function; the greater the risk-aversity the greater is the effect of changes 




























































































this probability do have an important effect but note that since the data do 
not appear consistent with much risk aversion, the effect of changes in 
disability benefit level (D in equation (4)) are probably more important.
3. UNCERTAIN LABOUR MARKET PROSPECTS
The type of uncertainty considered in the last section was exclusively 
related to benefit prospects, but not to wages or employment opportunities. 
We now turn to an analysis of the problem from another viewpoint: how do 
incentive effects of a given benefit scheme change if wages and employment 
prospects are uncertain? We restrict our attention to a static model of 
labour-leisure choice.
The issue was investigated in detail by Cowell (1981). He distinguishes 
between two types of wage uncertainty. Firstly, uncertainty with respect to 
the wage rate itself. For a given supply of labour H, the individual will 
obtain an uncertain return W, but he will be employed with certainty. 
Secondly, for a given wage of level W and desired hours H, it is uncertain 
whether he will be employed. Cowell investigates the impact of different tax 
and benefit schemes on the optimal supply of labour.
In his basic model the combined tax and income maintenance system has 
the following form:
T = (t.W.H) - B; (5)
t is a uniform marginal tax rate levied on all earned income, W is the wage 
rate, H is the amount of time offered to the market. B are benefits which in 
the basic model are assumed to be universal, depending neither on the 
individual's choices nor on the outcome of any uncertain event (an example of 
such a benefit would be Child Benefit in the UK). T may be positive or 
negative, depending on whether the individual pays more tax then he receives 
in benefit or vice versa. In contrast to the standard labour-leisure choice 
analysis, the wage W is a stochastic variable, depending on the state of 
nature. To keep the model simple, there are only two states of the world: a 
favourable one in which W = W1, with probability (1 -p), and an unfavourable 
one, in which W = W% with probability p. If W! = 0 this generalises the 




























































































is then given by W.H - T.
The individual maximizes a specific form of utility function with 
leisure and consumption as its arguments; this function exhibits decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. Maximisation is subject to the stochastic budget 
constraint described above. Cowell now investigates separately the impact of 
changes in the transfer B or the marginal tax rate t on the supply of labour 
under the assumption that the disutility of work is equal to the disutility 
of involuntary unemployment. He first confirms if there is no uncertainty (p 
= 0), both an increase in B for constant t and an increase in t for constant 
B will decrease the supply of labour (assuming leisure is a normal good). 
These are the conventional results: both policies are found to provide a 
disincentive effect.
However, in the case of uncertainty, the impact of both policies on 
labour supply is ambiguous. An increase in the lump sum transfer B or the 
marginal tax rate t may increase labour supply for certain values of p and of 
the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. These effects are due 
to the uncertainty reducing role of the tax and income maintenance scheme. 
An increase in the tax rate t reduces the dispersion of possible returns from 
the supply of labour to the market. An increase in the transfer B increases 
the guaranteed income of the individual. Cowell points out that standard 
portfolio theory would suggest that either policy would encourage risk-taking, 
in this case supplying labour in return for the uncertain W.
When undertaking policy reform, governments may change both taxes and 
benefits at the same time. They are also interested in defining particular 
target groups. Thus for policy purposes, two questions arise: firstly, is it 
possible to increase the progressivity of the tax and income maintenance 
scheme and to raise work incentives without changing expected ex-post 
consumption or expected tax liabilities? Secondly, is it possible to identify 
the segment of the population for which the positive incentive effect is 
likely to occur? Cowell confirms that the first of these questions can be 
answered in the affirmative, the occurrence of the incentive-increasing effect 
depending on the degree of risk aversity, probabilities of the state of the 
world p, and on the ratio of transfer income to net earnings. Regarding the 
second question, he identifies the segment of the population for which the 
incentive-increasing effects are most likely to occur as being characterized
"by relatively high risk aversion, significant but not enormous wage





























































































People with these characteristics may be fairly poor with little income other 
than earnings, high income variability and with quite strong risk aversion. 
Cowell's analysis shows that the introduction of uncertainty with repsect to 
labour market prospects may change the perception of an optimal tax and 
benefit scheme.
4. MEANS-TESTED BENEFIT AND INTERTEMPORAL UNCERTAINTY
To this point we have considered the decisions of individuals in the 
presence of uncertainty. In this section we introduce uncertainty into the 
analysis of the effect of benefits on family labour supply. We do this by 
considering the impact of a benefit in which entitlement depends on family 
income, in other words there is a family means-test. We look at the impact 
of the means-test not on the benefit claimant's behaviour but on the labour 
supply of other members of the claimant's family.4 This serves two purposes. 
Firstly, we highlight an area of the literature on disincentives which we 
believe deserves more attention; there has been surprisingly little 
recognition of the need to look at the effect of means-testing the benefit of 
one person in the family on the labour supply of other members whose income 
is included in this means-test. Secondly, we show how the presence of 
uncertainty can rationalise empirical facts that are inconsistent with the 
predictions of the few studies of this issue to date; these are based on a 
static model with no uncertainty. The uncertainty we are concerned with in 
this section relates to job prospects, as in Section 3; we assume that the 
operation of the means-test and the administration of benefit is itself 
certain.
Discussion of the distinction between the impact on the labour market 
of insurance and means-tested unemployment benefit often neglects the fact 
that the latter imposes a high marginal rate of tax on family income. 
Consider the situation of an unemployed man receiving means-tested benefit 
with maximum entitlement (if no other family income is present) of b. If his 
wife works, her earnings reduce her husband's benefit £ for £, once they 
exceed a disregarded level k. In other words, family income is subjected to 
an implicit 100% marginal rate of tax when her earnings are in the range [k, 




























































































expires at this point. This system is essentially that which applies in the 
UK benefit Income Support, received by some two-thirds of men in the 
registered unemployed stock; the system also describes the essentials of the 
German Unemployment Assistance benefit (Arbeitslosenhilfe).
The resulting budget constraint in a static labour-leisure choice 
diagram is shown in Figure 2. We assume that the family has no sources of 
income other than the means-tested unemployment benefit and the wife's 
earnings, earned at the wage rate W" (we ignore explicit income taxes). The 
budget constraint in Figure 2 is flat along the segment AB. With conventional 
preferences, no woman should locate along this part of the budget constraint 
in a simple labour-leisure choice model.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The impact of the means-test in practice has been investigated in 
Britain by Garcia (1989, 1991) and Kell and Wright (1990). Both estimate 
econometric models of female labour supply in which the current period labour 
supply of women married to unemployed men is related to their current period 
budget constraint of the type shown in Figure 2. The results of both studies 
suggests that the Income Support means-test has a significant impact on the 
behaviour of married women.
However, it remains the case that, in defiance of the prediction of the 
simplest theoretical model, some women married to unemployed men in Britain 
are observed to be supplying hours at a level which suggest that they are 
located along the flat segment in Figure 2 (Dilnot and Kell, 1987). This may 
be because work itself yields utility or because constraints placed by 
employers on hours worked rule out location at the kink point B. But in our 
view an important possible explanation involves the introduction of 
uncertainty into the analysis as we show in the rest of this section.
A static framework in which current wife's labour supply is modelled as 
a fjnction of the current budget constraint neglects the fact that the 
disincentive from means-testing is only temporary, lasting just as long as the 
husband is unemployed. What difference should the recognition of the 
temporary nature of the budget constraint make to the analysis? If the wife 




























































































needed. But if the wife does have a job when her husband enters unemployment 
then she needs to consider whether quitting to avoid a temporary disincentive 
is the right long-run strategy - she may want her job back when the husband 
leaves unemployment and the disincentive from means-testing is removed.
In what follows we set-up a simple two period model assuming that the 
husband is unemployed in the first period but may or may not be in the second 
period. The wife has to decide whether to quit in the first period in the 
face of the means-test applied to her earnings as part of her husband's 
unemployment benefit assessment. If she does quit we assume that her job 
prospects in the second period are uncertain; if she stays in her job in the 
first period we assume that she can retain it with certainty in the second 
period. This is the key assumption of the model; uncertainty about her future 
job prospects reduce the wife's propensity to quit in the first period (the 
uncertainty about the husband's employment prospects is not in fact important 
to the main result).
This feature is similar to an important aspect of the Halpern and 
Hausman model of disability benefit and participation which was discussed in 
Section 2. Just as we assume that quitting reduces future employment 
prospects, Halpern and Hausman assumed that quitting and making an application 
for disability benefit would reduce the wage the individual could command in 
the labour market if the application were to be rejected. (Note that Halpern 
and Hausman collapse their model onto one period but the same intertemporal 
considerations are implicitly present.)
In period one the husband is unemployed with potential benefit 
entitlement b; the actual benefit amount received depends on the operation of 
the means-test. In the second period the husband will be offered with 
probability, p, a job paying E", where E" > b. The wife, who prior to the 
husband's unemployment has been working, must decide in the first period 
whether to quit or to carry on in her job. Her working results in a level of 
earnings, E"; if she works in the second period she also receives this level 
of earnings since we assume that the wage rate is the same in both periods and 
that constraints on the demand side of the labour market are such that hours 
are not variable (a single hours-wage package is all that is available). She 
cannot make marginal changes to her hours in period one (or period two) - she 
simply has to decide whether to work, and receive E", or to quit, in which 
case we assume she receives c, the equivalent of the opportunity costs of her 




























































































and where c < E". (We assume that she receives no unemployment benefit 
herself, being disqualified from receipt for voluntarily leaving her job). 
If she quits in the first period she receives a job offer in the second period 
with probability q.
The wife's earnings are disregarded for the purpose of the benefit 
means-test up to a level k. We assume that if she works her earnings exceed 
this disregarded level (E“ > k). Between k and [k + b] her earnings result 
in an implicit 100% marginal rate of tax on her husband's benefit. 
Accordingly, if the husband is unemployed and the wife employed, the net 
contribution of her work to family income in that period is equal to s, where
s = k if E“ < b + k (6)
= k + E“ - ( b + k )  otherwise.
The opportunity costs of the wife working are assumed to exceed the income she 
can contribute if the husband is unemployed (c > s).
To derive results we need to specify how the couple takes decisions and 
what yields them utility. We assume that neither husband nor wife derive 
utility from leisure; if the wife quits work in the first period it is because 
she wishes to gain c and not because she enjoys leisure. For simplicity we 
assume that the couple operate as a unit and are risk-neutral. This implies 
that their aim is simply to maximise their total joint two-period income (we 
ignore discounting).5 Given those assumptions we have made already, this 
specific optimising behaviour has two implications for the couple's labour 
supply decisions. Firstly, the husband will always accept a job offer in 
period two. Secondly, if her husband is employed in period two, the wife will 
work if she can in that period but she will not if he is still unemployed.
The only decision variable in the model is the wife's decision as to 
whether to quit or not in the first period. If she does quit, total two- 
period income is given by the following expression:
I1 = b + c + E" + E“ with probability p.q
I! = b + 2.c + E" with probability p.(l-q)
I3 = 2.[b + c] with probability (1-p);




























































































r  = b + s + E" + E' 
I5 = 2.b + s + c
with probability p 
with probability (1-p).
The wife will quit in period one if expected two-period income stemming from 
this decision exceeds that if she continues to work despite the means-test. 
She will quit if:
Equation (7) can be used to show that the decision to quit in the first 
period depends positively on the opportunity cost of her working, c, and on 
her second period probability of a job offer if she quits in the first period, 
q. The decision depends negatively on her earning power E", the lower 
threshold for the means-test, k, her husband's benefit, b (in the case that 
E“ > [b + k]), and his second period probability of a job, p.
This simple model has several undesirable features (including the 
absence of any utility derived from leisure). Nevertheless, we feel that even 
the risk-neutral version described above offers useful insights into the 
potential effect of a common form of benefit system and gives a richer view 
of its implications for incentives to work in the family-decision making 
context than would be obtained from a static model. The richer view stems 
from the introduction of uncertainty about the wife's future job prospects. 
As with the introduction of entitlement uncertainty in the models reviewed in 
Section 2, we believe that this adds a realism to the analysis of the 
disincentive effects of benefit systems which has been too often missing in 
much of the literature.
5. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have argued for more attention to be paid to certain 
forms of uncertainty in the analysis of the disincentive effects of benefits. 
In Section 2 we reviewed research which has allowed for the important real 
world feature of uncertainty surrounding entitlement to benefits. As the 
awareness of the complexity of benefit schemes increases among those doing 
research on incentives so should the need to consider entitlement uncertainty. 
This uncertainty is present in well-established benefit programmes in Western 
economies; it seems not unreasonable to suppose that it is even more prevalent




























































































in certain benefit programmes in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, 
notably those which are entirely new such as unemployment benefit. 
Uncertainty of this form implies that the standard analysis of incentive 
effects which assumes certain benefit entitlement may lead to misleading 
results. It may also imply that incentives could be improved in some cases 
by simply reducing uncertainty, although in some cases the opposite may be 
true.
In Section 3 we considered the impact of a given benefit system if 
uncertainty about labour market prospects is introduced in a simple static 
model. The paper which we reviewed showed that conclusions under uncertainty 
could be rather different from those when labour market prospects are certain. 
Section 4 also focused on uncertainty of labour market prospects but in the 
context of family rather than individual labour supply. Looking at couples 
where the husband is unemployed, we analysed the effect on the wife's labour 
supply of including her income in a means-test for her husband's benefit. We 
used a simple two period model of family behaviour. When the future 
probability of a job is considered we showed how a static model's prediction 
that a married woman would quit in the face of a 100% implicit marginal tax 
rate on her earnings is too simple a representation of the situation. This 
again shows how consideration of uncertainty modifies one's conclusions about 
benefit effects. We hope that research of the type we have considered in this 





























































































1. Some notable recent papers in this literature are Meyer (1989), Mofitt
(1989) , and Atkinson (1990). A now rather old important survey paper is that 
by Danziger et al (1981). See also references to more recent surveys in Barr
(1990) .
2. For a discussion of the job search model see Lippman and McCall (1976), 
Hey (1979), Pissarides (1985).
3. Katz and Meyer argue that the impact of this dummy variable could 
represent the actions of employers with pre-planned policies of re-calling 
previously laid-off workers at the end of their benefit period.
4. This section draws on a more extended analysis in Dustmann and 
Micklewright (1991).
5. In the fuller analysis on which we have drawn here we consider both risk 
aversion and discounting. Note that uncertainty is not technically essential 
to our results in a risk-neutral framework; the same results could be achieved 




























































































Figure 1: Labour Supply and Disability Benefit
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